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The Tiebout model assumes that individuals 'vote with their feet' and choose to locate in the jurisdiction
which best matches their fiscal preferences. In this paper, we test Tiebout's voting mechanism by examining
whether housing purchase decisions are sensitive to changes in local property tax rates. Results from
previous empirical tests of the link between property taxes and mobility are mixed and typically suffer
from a myriad of identification problems including the confounding influence of tax rates on public
good levels, tax endogeneity arising as a result of jurisdictional composition, and aggregation bias.
In this paper, we are able to overcome many of the traditional obstacles to identification by: 1) focusing
on purchasers of vacation homes who arguably receive no benefits from public goods funded by the
tax change; 2) examining an exogenous and differential change in tax rates that arose from Michigan's
Proposal A in 1994; and 3) using a high-resolution tax dataset at the Census Tract level. Our results
provide some of the clearest evidence to date that household location choices are sensitive to tax changes.
Further, consistent with theoretical predictions, the impact of tax changes on housing counts is found
to be sensitive to the elasticity of housing supply.
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Since Tiebout's (1956) seminal work on competition between local jurisdictions, public
economists have argued that individuals vote with their feet and locate in jurisdictions which
provide their favored tax/public goods pair. On the tax side, theoretical work has focused
on the way in which the Tiebout mechanism causes changes in rates to be capitalized into
housing prices. Hamilton (1975), Henderson (1980) and Henderson (1985) argue that
capitalization will not occur if there is a perfectly elastic supply of housing. As households
migrate into a jurisdiction, an entrepreneur supplies them with a new housing stock, leav-
ing the current housing prices unchanged since increased demand is reected solely in new
buildings. On the other side of the debate, Yinger (1982), Yinger (1995), Wheaton (1993),
Hoyt (1999), and Epple (1981), argue that capitalization will occur, as long as the housing
supply function is upward sloping.1
Empirical work has also largely focused on capitalization instead of mobility. Early work
on the capitalization eect was undertaken by Orr (1968) and Oates (1969). Orr's analysis
supported the hypothesis of no capitalization, while Oates found a capitalization eect.
More recently, Brasington (2002) estimated the housing price hedonic for both the interior
and edge of an urban area and found that supply elasticity and public good expenditures
capitalization are inversely related. While the magnitude of public goods capitalization is an
ongoing debate its inverse relationship with supply elasticity is, for the most part, accepted.2
Empirical estimates of the pure-tax eect on household mobility have been mixed. The
ambiguous results are most likely caused by identication problems due to the confounding
inuence of public goods, tax endogeneity, and aggregation bias. Through the use of a
structural reform in Michigan's school nance system, a focus on the vacation home market,
1See Brasington (2002) for an in depth discussion and empirical test of the inverse relationship between
capitalization and housing supply elasticity.
2The literature on capitalization is extensive and an excellent survey on both the theoretical arguments
and empirical results is found in Ross and Yinger (1999).
2and a census tract level dataset we are able to overcome many of the traditional identication
obstacles. We provide some of the clearest evidence to date that residential mobility is
sensitive to tax changes.
1.1 Identication Issues
Several confounding inuences make it dicult to empirically isolate pure-tax impacts on
home purchase decisions. First, dierences in tax levels are typically associated with dier-
ences in levels of public good provision. Identifying the presumed negative eect of a tax in
the presence of positive eects associated with the provision of public goods that are funded
by said tax is a potentially dicult task. In perhaps the strongest empirical work to date
on pure-tax mobility, Farnham and Sevak (2006) utilize a novel approach to this particu-
lar problem. They argue, based upon a life-cycle model of mobility, that the migration of
`empty-nesters' will be sensitive to dierences in school taxes, but not to the public goods
(public schooling) that these taxes provide. Farnham and Sevak nd mixed evidence of the
eect of taxation on household mobility { with the results being dependent both upon scale
(within or across states) and state level scal constraints (i.e. the presence of school revenue
equalization).
Our estimation approach employs a similar strategy of decoupling the public good and tax
eects on household mobility by studying a population which does not consume the public
good. Rather than the `empty-nest' population, we evaluate the impact of school taxes on
the location decisions of vacation homeowners. Since vacation homeowners by denition
do not consume local public school provision, the entire mobility response in reaction to a
change in school taxes is independent of the changes in public school quality and the mobility
response is therefore attributable to a pure-tax eect.
A second source of endogeneity is due to the `chicken or egg problem'. In this case it is
not clear whether tax rates are attracting a specic demographic group or if a demographic
3group is voting to set tax rates so they meet their scal preferences. Consider the following
observation on retirees and taxes: retirees are attracted to the southern United States and
southern states have lower income taxes. This relationship may be described in two ways.
First, it is possible that retirees are moving to the south for tax incentives. However, it is
also possible that retirees move for other reasons such as a superior climate and then vote
for lower taxes once they arrive. The issue of causality is important, as shown in recent work
by Conway and Rork (2006). Conway and Rork nd that elderly migration patterns are
not driven by levels of EIG (Estate, Inheritance, or Gift) taxes but rather that the causation
does, in fact, run in reverse.3 In the current paper, we study the vacation home market.
Vacation homeowners do not have a vote in local elections and therefore their presence in a
jurisdiction will not directly bias tax rates.
However, while the vacation home population does not have the power to directly vote
on local taxes, their presence may aect rates. Jurisdictional residents may be expected to
base their public expenditure and taxation decisions partially on the fact that the vacation
homeowners will bear a portion of the tax burden. In this case, the larger the vacation
home tax base in a jurisdiction, the lower the tax price of public goods for voting residents.
As a result, even if the vacation home population is completely unresponsive to tax rates,
correlations between vacation home populations and tax rates may exist. Anderson (2006)
provides empirical evidence that supports the relevance of this tax exporting motive. In his
study of the vacation home market in Minnesota, he nds that a one-percent increase in the
size of the vacation home tax base resulting from an exogenous change in assessment ratios
will result in a .36% increase in per capita public goods spending. Because our analysis
focuses explicitly on the market for vacation homes, we need to control for this potential
endogeneity. As discussed below, we overcome this problem by leveraging exogenous changes
3This issue is of potential concern in regards to the ndings of Farnham and Sevak (2006). Here we need
to be concerned that `empty-nesters' inuence the political process in the areas where they choose to locate
{ yielding lower tax rates in these areas.
4in school taxes that arose from the passage of Michigan's Proposal A in 1994.
Finally, even if both the direction of causality is determined and the eect of public
goods is decoupled from tax rates, aggregation bias may still obfuscate the eect of taxes
on household mobility. The majority of previous research uses highly aggregated, state or
county level tax and population data to explore the tax eect on mobility4. One would expect
the measurement error imparted by these approximations to bias estimated mobility eects
toward zero since the impact of housing supply elasticity is obfuscated through this large
spatial aggregation. For example, theory suggests that a rightward shift in housing demand
due to a tax decrease may result in capitalization, mobility, or both depending upon a local
jurisdiction's housing supply elasticity. In rural areas where the housing supply is elastic, a
shift in demand leads to in-migration. In an urban area, with an inelastic housing supply, the
shift in demand results in housing capitalization. Therefore, an estimate of the tax change
on mobility which does not control for local heterogeneity in housing supply elasticity has
the potential to overstate the eect of taxes on mobility in urban areas and understate the
eect in rural areas.5 In the current paper, we use a highly disaggregated census tract level
data set that allows us to construct location specic variables that control for housing supply
elasticity as well as other determinants of local mobility response. Therefore, we are able to
overcome aggregation bias which may be introduced from generalizing population and tax
data to the state level.
4See for instance: Conway and Houtenville (1998, 2001, 2003), Dresher (1994), and Duncombe et al.
(2003).
5An additional empirical consideration regarding supply elasticity was identied by Glaeser and Gyourko
(2005) and Glaeser and Gyourko (2006), who show that housing supply elasticity is sensitive to the direction
of demand shifts as a result of the durability of housing structures. Since the vast majority of jurisdictions
in our dataset exhibit positive vacation home growth, the relevant elasticity is that associated with growing
demand { and we are not in a position to have to consider diering elasticities for growth and decline.
51.2 Michigan's Proposal A
As described above, a fundamental assumption of the Tiebout model is that individuals vote
with their feet and locate in the jurisdiction that best matches their scal preferences. While
Tiebout sorting depends upon household mobility, empirical support for tax-driven mobility
is mixed, most likely as an outcome of the diculties in estimation. Our analysis overcomes
these identication issues by focusing on the impact of local property tax changes in Michigan
between 1993 and 1995 on the distribution of vacation homes in the state. These tax changes
arose as a result of `Proposal A', a state-wide overhaul of the school funding mechanism
which was passed by Michigan voters in 1994. Proposal A led to a complete re-ordering
of school taxes rates in Michigan.6 The law had three main components. First, in order
to facilitate revenue equalization, a signicant portion of school funding was shifted away
from local property taxes to a statewide sales tax. Secondly, a statewide 6 mill property tax
was levied and redistributed by the state. Finally a homestead property tax exemption was
implemented that allowed local taxing authorities, in this case school districts, to provide tax
relief of 18 mills ($18 for every $1,000 of taxable value) for an individual's primary residence.
This policy change made it possible for local school districts to shift a greater portion of
their local school operating costs onto the owners of vacation homes.
While there is almost no meaningful variation in the various jurisdiction's choice of tax
dierential7 there is marked variation in the tax changes experienced by vacation homeowners
in dierent locations. The important eect of this policy is that, once we control for the
initial distribution of housing types and school tax levels, the change in tax rates can be
treated as an exogenous `natural experiment' thus solving any potential endogeneity problem
associated with the link between vacation home populations and tax rates. Further, the
population of interest can be reasonably assumed to be indierent to the distribution of
6Courant et al. (1995) provides a detailed analysis of this law, especially its implications for school
nance.
7The State of Michigan forced most local school districts to move to the 18 mill dierential.
6school expenditures. We therefore needn't worry about the confounding interactions of tax
rates and public goods provision. Finally, in contrast to most previous work on the issue,
we have constructed a tax data set with a very high level of spatial resolution (identifying
tax rates down to each individual taxing jurisdiction). The high resolution data overcomes
the traditional aggregation bias.
2 Data
Our study area is the entire state of Michigan. The data for our analysis fall in to three main
categories. First, we identify a set of spatially delineated communities that form the basis
of our analysis and use Census data to determine the number of vacation homes in each of
these communities for the years 1990 and 2000. Second, we construct a spatially delineated
tax rate dataset which identies taxes for each level of local government for the years 1993
thru 2000. This spatial tax rate data is then used to compute the tax levels for each of our
communities. Finally, for each of the communities, variables are constructed to control for
additional determinants of vacation home demand.
2.1 Communities and the Prevalence of Vacation Homes
Our measure of the prevalence of vacation homes comes from the 1990 and 2000 Decennial
Censuses identied at the Tract Level. Unfortunately, Census Tract boundaries often change
from Census to Census. As a result, it is not possible to use Census Tract boundaries to
directly delineate communities when evaluating the change in the number of vacation homes
between 1990 and 2000. To overcome this problem, we identify sets of 1990 and 2000 tracts
that when aggregated together share a common boundary across both Censuses. In the
remainder of the paper, we refer to these aggregated groups of tracts as `aggroups'. The
State of Michigan is covered by 1830 aggroups. These are aggregated from 2533 and 2721
7tracts in the 1990 and 2000 Census, respectively.
Given our aggroup denitions, we next construct a measure of both the number of vaca-
tion homes and the density of vacation homes in each aggroup. This is done as follows. First,
for both 1990 and 2000 Decennial Censuses, we take the reported number of vacation homes
in each tract and sum across all tracts in a given aggroup. Next, the by-aggroup vacation
home counts are divided by the area of each aggroup - yielding a measure of the density
of vacation homes in each aggroup (Vacation Homes/Km2). An additional complication is
the presence of large areas of publicly owned land in Michigan. By denition, these areas
have been removed from potential development. To provide a more appropriate measure of
the level of vacation home development in each aggroup, we use a GIS dataset (described
below) on the location of publicly owned lands acquired from the Michigan Department of
Geographic Information to exclude these publicly owned lands when calculating the area of
each aggroup. Similarly, GIS water boundary data is used to exclude lakes and rivers when
calculating the area of each aggroup. Panel 1 of Figure 1 displays the 1990 vacation home
densities and Panel 2 of the gure displays the change in density from 1990 to 2000.
Finally, in order to control for diering housing supply elasticities across aggroups, we
create a dummy variable for urban areas - aggroups where greater than 90% of the component
tract areas are classied as urban in the 1990 Decennial Census.8
2.2 Tax Rates
School district tax rates in each school taxing jurisdiction for the years 1993 thru 2000 were
obtained from the Michigan State Tax Commission and the Department of Treasury Oce
of Revenue and Tax Analysis. One limit of our data is that while second home counts are
available for 1990 and 2000, the tax change that we are interested in occurred between 1993
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Figure 2: Distribution of 93-95 School Tax Changes
and 1995 (the two year lag reects the fact that it took two years for these adjustments
to be completed). Figure 2 displays the distribution of these tax changes. Potential issues
arise due to the limitations associated with the decennial nature of the Census. While using
2000 vacation home counts is consistent with an expected lag in the adjustment of vacation
home populations to changes in the tax rates, bias could be introduced by including changes
in vacation home counts that occur between 1990 and 1993. Two specic concerns exist.
First, assuming taxes were constant between 1990 and 1993, inclusion of the changes that
occur over this time frame will introduce measurement error in our dependent variable which
may weaken the precision of our estimates.9 Of greater concern is the possibility that tax
changes occurred between 1990 and 1993 that are correlated with the 1993-1995 changes -
thus, biasing our estimates. Table 1 presents the correlation between tax rates for adjacent
years from 1990 to 2000. Because we have been unable to locate school district level data
for the years 1990-1992, county aggregates are used for the rst three year pairs. District
level correlations are presented for the remaining years. These correlations clearly show that
9In our analysis this concern is partially alleviated by the inclusion of 1993 school tax rates as a control
variable.
10Table 1: School Millage Rate Correlations 1990-2000
Years 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00
Cnty 0.9779 0.9739 0.9680
Dist 0.2093 0.4205 0.9394 0.9545 0.9669 0.9718 0.9707
tax rates are stable prior to the 1993-1995 period when the Proposal A driven tax changes
occurred. A nal concern is that changes in vacation home counts are being driven by tax
changes that may have occurred after the 93-95 changes.
Again, the data suggest that tax rates were stable following the Proposal A adjustments.
Below, we test for the sensitivity of our results by examining the eect of 1995-2000 tax
changes. This analysis suggests that post 1995 changes are not driving our empirical results.
In order to identify school tax rates for each aggroup, Census TIGER les were used to
identify the spatial location of each school taxing jurisdiction in the state. These tax juris-
dictions were then overlaid onto the corresponding census locations. The task of attaching
tax rates to these aggroups is complicated by the fact that the tax jurisdictions do not share
common borders with the aggroups. To address this problem, for each aggroup we compute







where A is the total aggroup area, ai is the area covered by tax rate i and N is the total
number of unique tax jurisdictions within the aggroup.
One potential concern with this approach is the possibility for aggregation bias which
could lead to attenuation of the parameter estimates on the tax variables due to measurement
error. So that we could identify those aggroups with the largest potential for this type of
bias and implement sensitivity analysis, we constructed tax dissimilarity indices for each
11aggroup. These indices accounted for the deviations from the area weighted average tax
within the aggroup, while at the same time scaling these deviations by the sub-area of the






ai(i    )
2; (2)
where all variables are dened as above for Equation 1.
2.3 Additional Determinants of Vacation Home Demand
Finally, data was constructed to control for other determinants of vacation home demand.
The rst set of control variables captures the eect that large numbers of potential vacation
home-owners have on the number of vacation home-owners in a given location. According
to the National Association of Realtors,
Typical vacation-home buyers in 2005 were 52 years old, earned $82,800, and
purchased a property that was a median of 197 miles from their primary residence.
In order to develop measures of potential demand, demographic data was collected for all
tracts within the ve states that share a boundary with the state of Michigan. This data
was used to compute the count of householders between the age of 45 and 64 years old with
a median income greater than $50,000 for both 1990 and 2000. We then computed the count
of these householders that lived within 10, 50, 100, 250 and 500 miles of each aggroup. For
each aggroup, this data was then used to construct counts of potential vacation home buyers
residing in a set of four distant bands (10-50 miles, 50-100 miles, 100-250 miles, and 250-500
miles). Changes in these counts between 1990 and 2000 were also computed.
The calculations were complicated by the fact that for the Great Lakes region, distances
need to be constructed over a non-convex surface. For instance, if an individual with a house
in Chicago wanted to travel to Traverse City, Michigan, she would need to drive around
12Lake Michigan. Thus, simply calculating the straight line distance from the centroid of her
home census tract to the centroid of the appropriate aggroup in Traverse City would greatly
underestimate the true distance. To compute appropriate distances, that account for the
need to travel around the Great Lakes, we rst constructed a network of paths connecting all
potential rst home locations and all aggroups (see gure 3). For all possible combinations
of rst and vacation home locations, we then compute the shortest distance using a modied
Dijkstra algorithm on the network and used this as the travel distance between the two
locations.
The second set of control variables account for the presence of public lands and bodies
of water. In Northern Michigan and the Upper Peninsula, public lands comprise a large
percentage of the total land area. These public lands include State and National Forest,
State Parks, Military land, State Recreation Areas, State Wildlife Research Areas, and land
under control of the Nature Conservancy. These lands are important for two reasons. First,
the presence of public lands may be viewed as an amenity by vacation home owners because
they provide public access to lands which may be used for recreational purposes. Second, as
previously mentioned, the presence of public lands must be accounted for when the density
of vacation homes is computed within an aggroup. To identify the public lands area in each
aggroup, public lands boundary data provided by the Michigan Department of Geographic
Information was intersected with the aggroup boundary les and the area of intersection was
then calculated.
Lakes and Rivers are similarly important potential drivers of vacation home demand
and have been identied by The National Association of Realtors as a major determinant
in the locational choices of vacation home owners. As with public lands, it is not only
important to control for the amenity value, but also to remove from the computed aggroup
area the portion covered by water. To identify these areas, year 2000 Census water boundary
maps were combined with lake and river data from the State of Michigan Geographic Data
13Figure 3: Five state Distance Network
14Table 2: Summary Statistics
Summary Statistics (N=1828)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.





% AreaPublic 0.04 0.11
% Vacation Home 1990 0.08 0.27
Median Income 1990 4.31 5.02
First Home Density 1990 494.75 521.75
Vacation Home Density 1990 1.93 10.71
% Lake 0.01 0.04
% Lake2 0.00 0.02
No Lake 0.75 0.43
Demand 10-50 mi. 1990 11.43 7.53
Demand 50-100 mi. 1990 12.77 8.05
Demand 100-250 mi. 1990 67.40 23.68
 Demand 10-50 mi. 9.16 5.24
 Demand 50-100 mi. 11.59 6.14
 Demand 100-250 mi. 62.99 19.73
15Library and GIS routines were used to address dierences in the boundary les. Two separate
measures were constructed using this data. First, the area within each aggroup covered by
water was computed in the same manner as was the area of public lands. Second, in order
to measure the potential for waterfront development, the percentage of the total land area
within each aggroup located within 100 meters of a shoreline was computed.
Finally, tract-level Census data was aggregated to the aggroup level to develop a set of
demographic control variables. These variables include median income of aggroup residents,
the percentage of aggroup residents that own their home, and the density of rst homeowners
in the aggroup (constructed in the same manner as the vacation home density variable).
Summary statistics for all variables are presented in Table 2.
3 Estimation and Results
As discussed above, our strategy for identifying the impact of school tax rates on vacation
home development leverages the change in tax rates that occurred in Michigan between 1993
and 1995 as a result of the passage of Proposal A. This law led to a complete re-alignment
of property tax rates in the state of Michigan. Because these changes were driven by a
state-level shift in policy and owners of vacation homes are not consumers of local school
expenditures, this `natural experiment' overcomes most of the problems with confounding
inuences that typically plague analysis of a pure tax eect on location choice. There
is however one important caveat. The changes that occurred as a result of the new law
were systematically linked to pre-change tax revenues. As a result, to insure that we are
identifying an actual response to dierential changes in tax rates, in our regression analysis
we control for pre-change tax levels and pre-change levels of primary and vacation homes.
The inclusion of the baseline tax rates also helps to account for the fact that pre-tax change
migration might have been driven by dierences in the pre-tax change millage rates. The
16urban indicator variable is included to control for the theoretical prediction that supply
responses will be attenuated (potentially absent) when supply is inelastic. To test for this
eect, the urban indicator is interacted with both the tax change and baseline millage rate
in order to estimate the dierential eects on mobility as a result of diering housing supply
elasticities.
A further wrinkle in the data is the signicant heterogeneity in size across aggroups.
To account for this heterogeneity, we use as our dependent variable the density of vacation
homes (number of vacation homes in the aggroup divided by the area of the aggroup that is
neither public lands or water). The Basic model for estimation is given in Equation 3.
VseasDensityi = (3)
1 + 2i + 3(i  Urbani)
4BaselineTaxi + 5(BaselineTaxi  Urbani)
6Demographicsi + 7Amenitiesi
+8Demandi + 9Demandi + 10Urbani + Ci + ui
Where VseasDensityi is the change in vacation home density in aggroup i from 1990
to 2000, i is the change in the tax rates between 1993 and 1995, Urbani is the dummy
variable equal to one if over 90% of the aggroup is in an urban area. BaselineTaxi is the 1993
tax rate, Demographicsi consist of demographic controls such as median income and rst and
vacation home densities in 1990, Demandi are the relevant population in each distance band
in 1990, and Demandi are the changes in the relevant populations located in the distance
bands from 1990 to 2000. Finally, Ci is a county-specic xed eect for the county in which
aggroup i is located. As a result of the inclusion of these county xed eects the model
identies changes in the distribution of vacation home locations that are driven by within
17county variation in the 1993-1995 tax rate change - controlling for within county variation
in the other incorporated covariates10
Estimation results, including several sensitivity tests, are presented in Table 3. Model 1
reports results for the basic specication of Equation 3. Model 2 controls for the fact that the
simple model puts equal weights on aggroups with no vacation homes and those with large
numbers of vacation homes, running a weighted regression using the number vacation homes
in 1990 as weights.11 Model 3 tests for the impact of outliers, dropping the 10 aggroups
with the biggest gain and biggest loss in vacation home density. Model 4 both weights by
vacation home population and drops outliers. Finally, Model 5 addresses the issue of possible
aggregation bias associated with aggroups which incorporate multiple school districts with
dierent tax rates. This is done by dropping those observations that fall in the highest
quartile of the dissimilarity index. The 1172 aggroups which have the least aggregation bias
are used in this regression.
Because, by construction, the weighted models (two, four and ve), place more emphasis
on those locations that comprise the bulk of the vacation home market in Michigan, we
believe they will most accurately reect the `average' tax eect. For this reason, and because
we are also concerned about the eect of outliers and the possibility of attenuation bias
from aggregating multiple tax rates within some aggroups, we focus our discussion of the
results on models four and ve which we believe to be the most robust specications. These
specications are identical and include all controls, except for the fact that model ve drops
those aggroups containing the most variation in within-aggroup tax rates. We would however
note that our results are consistent across all specications.
First, we consider the estimated eects for the control variables - focusing on those which
are the signicant determinants of changes in vacation home density. In both models, a
10Standard errors where computed both with and without error clustering at the county level - with no
dierence in the signicance levels across the two approaches.
11Sample size drops in this model because ten aggroups contain no vacation homes in 1990.
18Table 3: Change in Vacation Home Density (Based on 1993-1995 Tax Change)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
93 95 -0.107** -0.227*** -0.025 -0.060*** -0.056***
(-2.15) (-6.10) (-0.98) (-5.23) (-2.86)
93 95 * Urban Dummy 0.099* 0.124 0.020 0.084*** 0.074**
(1.87) (1.27) (0.73) (2.79) (2.09)
93 -0.253*** -0.453*** -0.071** -0.099*** -0.105***
(-3.66) (-8.91) (-2.00) (-6.16) (-3.97)
93 * Urban Dummy 0.157** -0.011 0.002 -0.048 -0.048
(2.10) (-0.07) (0.05) (-0.94) (-0.84)
Urban Dummy -4.350** -1.433 0.373 2.537* 2.423
(-2.01) (-0.30) (0.34) (1.67) (1.45)
% Vacation 1990 -0.780 -0.349** -0.352 -0.257*** -0.499***
(-1.64) (-1.98) (-1.35) (-4.29) (-6.51)
Median Income 1990 0.002 -0.022* 0.008 0.003 -0.011
(0.12) (-1.77) (1.09) (0.79) (-1.41)
% Area Public -1.114 0.169 -0.689 0.727*** 1.012***
(-1.01) (0.34) (-1.22) (4.52) (4.25)
First Home Density 1990 0.002*** 0.010*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(7.36) (9.96) (8.66) (7.33) (7.23)
Vacation Home Density 1990 0.038*** 0.023*** 0.011** 0.015*** 0.016***
(4.38) (7.10) (2.46) (14.54) (13.82)
% Lake 15.268*** 14.456*** 3.748 5.021*** 2.671
(4.27) (5.79) (1.46) (4.29) (1.59)
% Lake2 -28.631*** -26.218*** -5.108 -9.686*** -6.098
(-4.18) (-8.02) (-0.70) (-3.27) (-1.40)
No Lake 0.464* 0.237 0.203 0.131* 0.037
(1.83) (0.96) (1.51) (1.71) (0.39)
Demand 10-50 mi. 1990 0.147 -0.810** 0.155* 0.165 0.144
(0.85) (-2.02) (1.75) (1.31) (0.81)
Demand 50-100 mi. 1990 0.023 0.099 -0.003 0.389*** 0.362*
(0.08) (0.26) (-0.02) (3.14) (1.72)
Demand 100-250 mi. 1990 -0.245 -0.390 -0.237 0.123 0.038
(-0.75) (-1.18) (-1.43) (1.20) (0.18)
Demand 250-500 mi. 1990 -0.326 -0.753** -0.340* -0.051 -0.172
(-0.93) (-2.34) (-1.91) (-0.51) (-0.76)
 Demand 10-50 mi. -0.241 1.137** -0.251* -0.224 -0.217
(-0.83) (2.16) (-1.70) (-1.36) (-1.02)
 Demand 50-100 mi. -0.045 -0.409 0.031 -0.486*** -0.491**
(-0.12) (-0.89) (0.15) (-3.33) (-2.25)
 Demand 100-250 mi. 0.371 0.395 0.370* -0.126 -0.029
(0.95) (1.08) (1.87) (-1.12) (-0.14)
 Demand 250-500 mi. 0.446 0.893** 0.466** 0.068 0.179
(1.08) (2.54) (2.23) (0.62) (0.80)
cons -9.281 -1.331 -14.439* -0.061 2.172
(-0.61) (-0.21) (-1.84) (-0.03) (0.33)
r2 0.117 0.388 0.162 0.589 0.607
N 1825.000 1462.000 1787.000 1426.000 1172.000
Prob > F 0.724 0.260 0.636 0.404 0.563
Outlier Trimming No No Yes Yes Yes
Population Weights No Yes No Yes Yes
Similarity Control None None None None sim00s < 6.8
19higher percentage of the housing stock in use as vacation homes in 1990 is associated with
a lower rate of growth in vacation home density. As expected, the eect of the presence of
public lands in the aggroup is both positive and signicant. To allow for exibility in the
eect of access to lake frontage, we include an indicator for the presence of no lake frontage
and both linear and quadratic terms for the percentage of the aggroup in lake frontage.
Both models predict that the change in vacation homes is increasing in percent lake frontage
over the bulk of the observed distribution in lake frontages. However, these terms become
insignicant when the sample size is reduced to control for tax heterogeneity within the
aggroups. Finally, while jointly signicant, the distance*population demand variables are all
individually insignicant. This is likely due to the fact that inclusion of county xed eects
greatly reduces the relevant variation in these variables.
The model includes two dierent tax variables, the 1993 school millage rate (93) and the
1993 to 1995 change in the school millage rate (93 95). Both of these tax variables are
interacted with the housing supply elasticity dummies. The 1993 tax rates are included as
controls, and their coecient may be biased upward in magnitude due to the endogeneity
issues discussed above. Coecient estimates for this variable are negative and signicant in
all models.
Finally, we consider the impact of our exogenous tax instrument, the change in tax
rates between 1993 and 1995. Focusing on Models 4 and 5, the estimates suggest that
in rural areas a one standard deviation increase in this change is associated with a slower
rate of growth in vacation home density of between .25 and .3 vacation homes per square
kilometer (approximately 1/10th of the observed standard deviation in the sample). For
urban areas, the eect of the tax change on net mobility is insignicant (the F statistic on
93 95 + 93 95  Urban Dummy = 0). These results serve to reinforce the theoretical
argument that tax changes will lead to population changes when supply is elastic.
When evaluating these coecient estimates, it is important to note that these estimates
20are capturing only the eect of within county variation in tax rate changes. Taken together,
the results suggest that while tax rates are not the only driver of vacation home location
choice, they do have a marked eect on vacation home location choices.
One remaining concern is that our results are driven by changes in tax rates that occurred
between 1995 and 2000. As a sensitivity analysis, Table 4 presents results for the same
models, only using 1995-2000 tax changes as our policy variable. These results suggest that
tax changes from 1995-2000 are not driving the location decisions of the vacation home
population.12 Taken together, the coecients on the 1993 school millage rate and the 1993-
1995 change in millage rates provides some of the strongest evidence to date of a pure-tax
mobility eect and its link to the elasticity of housing supply.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we overcome the identication issues that are typically associated with iso-
lating the eect of taxes on housing location choices. Identication is achieved by isolating
exogenous changes in the distribution of local school tax rates that arose as a result of the
passage of `Proposal A' in Michigan in 1994. We then use a spatially disaggregated data
set on local property tax rates and focus on the responses in the market for vacation homes
to dierential changes in property tax rates. This approach allows us to overcome issues of
endogeneity, aggregation bias, and the confounding of tax rates and public goods provision
that has been typical of previous empirical work on the subject. Our empirical results pro-
vide some of the clearest evidence to date that net housing counts are sensitive to dierences
in property tax rates. Further, consistent with theoretical predictions, these impacts appear
to be sensitive to the elasticity of housing supply.
12This result is not surprising given the stability of tax rates following 1995 as reported in Table 1.
21Table 4: Change in Vacation Home Density (Based on 1995-2000 Tax Change)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
95 00 0.014 0.101* 0.011 0.014 0.009
(0.23) (1.92) (0.36) (0.85) (0.47)
95 00 * Urban Dummy 0.001 -0.054 0.020 -0.056 -0.026
(0.01) (-0.26) (0.55) (-0.89) (-0.39)
93 -0.138*** -0.234*** -0.044** -0.039*** -0.049***
(-3.17) (-6.68) (-1.98) (-3.55) (-2.82)
93 * Urban Dummy 0.051 -0.092 -0.020 -0.135*** -0.128***
(1.07) (-0.92) (-0.84) (-4.19) (-3.56)
Urban Dummy -1.958 -0.211 0.890 4.594*** 4.278***
(-1.14) (-0.06) (1.02) (4.03) (3.38)
% Vacation 1990 -0.753 -0.314* -0.337 -0.227*** -0.490***
(-1.58) (-1.76) (-1.29) (-3.78) (-6.30)
Median Income 1990 0.002 -0.016 0.008 0.004 -0.012
(0.10) (-1.30) (1.13) (1.11) (-1.51)
% Area Public -1.095 0.361 -0.695 0.786*** 1.066***
(-0.99) (0.71) (-1.22) (4.85) (4.45)
First Home Density 1990 0.002*** 0.010*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(7.35) (10.03) (8.62) (7.26) (7.21)
Vacation Home Density 1990 0.038*** 0.023*** 0.011** 0.014*** 0.015***
(4.41) (6.96) (2.47) (14.32) (13.71)
% Lake 15.212*** 15.410*** 3.661 5.597*** 3.606**
(4.25) (6.10) (1.43) (4.75) (2.17)
% Lake2 -28.679*** -27.066*** -5.097 -11.250*** -8.533**
(-4.19) (-8.18) (-0.70) (-3.76) (-1.98)
No Lake 0.442* 0.210 0.202 0.134* 0.027
(1.75) (0.84) (1.50) (1.73) (0.28)
Demand 10-50 mi. 1990 0.154 -0.673* 0.160* 0.144 0.094
(0.91) (-1.72) (1.86) (1.18) (0.57)
Demand 50-100 mi. 1990 0.033 0.146 -0.001 0.326*** 0.286
(0.11) (0.38) (-0.01) (2.68) (1.46)
Demand 100-250 mi. 1990 -0.210 -0.112 -0.232 0.157 0.035
(-0.65) (-0.34) (-1.42) (1.57) (0.18)
Demand 250-500 mi. 1990 -0.300 -0.632** -0.333* -0.050 -0.186
(-0.86) (-1.97) (-1.88) (-0.50) (-0.86)
 Demand 10-50 mi. -0.248 0.968* -0.261* -0.203 -0.163
(-0.86) (1.86) (-1.78) (-1.25) (-0.79)
 Demand 50-100 mi. -0.046 -0.374 0.030 -0.386*** -0.396*
(-0.12) (-0.83) (0.15) (-2.68) (-1.91)
 Demand 100-250 mi. 0.330 0.079 0.364* -0.171 -0.049
(0.85) (0.22) (1.86) (-1.54) (-0.25)
 Demand 250-500 mi. 0.415 0.772** 0.458** 0.067 0.174
(1.01) (2.19) (2.20) (0.61) (0.81)
cons -11.294 -6.539 -14.880* -1.235 3.857
(-0.74) (-1.04) (-1.90) (-0.64) (0.60)
r2 0.115 0.373 0.162 0.580 0.603
N 1825.000 1462.000 1787.000 1426.000 1172.000
Prob > F 0.740 0.814 0.156 0.489 0.798
Outlier Trimming No No Yes Yes Yes
Population Weights No Yes No Yes Yes
Similarity Control None None None None sim00s < 6.8
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